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Catalyst for Change in Indian 
Policies
Rakesh Sharma 
Since April 2020, a myriad of ‘whys and wherefores’ on China’s 
premeditated aggression around its periphery and against India in Eastern 
Ladakh, have been analysed ad infinitum. Inconclusive debates on China’s 
belligerence against its neighbouring countries have called it a pursuit of 
its geo-political ambitions by adopting expansionist designs. Wherein, 
mainly against India, China’s adventurism is argued on the grounds of 
abrogation of Article 370; infrastructure construction along the Line of 
Actual Control (LAC); New Delhi’s stringent opposition to the China-led 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP); growing linkages with the United States (US), and 
more specifically, the Indo-Pacific activism under Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue (QUAD). Suffice it to say, having deemed t  have ‘risen,’ China 
is stirring tense geopolitical confrontations that, undeniably, demonstrates 
Beijing’s hegemonic aspirations.
What calls for such a Chinese attitude? It can be rightly argued that 
China is seeking a global leadership, with an aim to set ‘right’ the perceived 
‘wrongs’ of its own history—as exemplified by its ‘national rejuvenation’ 
campaign under the policy of ‘Chinese Dream.’ Besides, Beijing’s growing 
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power index is manifested in its rising profiles as the second largest world 
economy with a nominal GDP (largest in PPP terms) and the world’s 
largest military1 with a burgeoning Military-Industrial Complex. China’s 
military might is complimented by the rapid modernisation of the People’s 
Liberation Army in terms of weapons, equipment, technologies and 
massive structural and doctrinal orientation. This is justified by China’s 
increased defence budget, which is second only to the US. 
China’s BRI has boosted its global presence by means of infrastructural 
projects in over 70 countries. Being the world’s largest exporting nation, BRI 
aims to connect China’s extensive manufacturing hubs, to be better served 
by global value chains in endeavouring to alter the way world does business. 
Through BRI, China plans to guarantee higher economic prosperity and 
increasing per capita income to lower internal anxieties, thus strengthening 
control and legitimacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
But all is indeed not hunky dory! Despite the economies of scale, 
China is overwhelmed by its geography with grave limitations of the first 
Island Chain and is attempting to open land corridors through Myanmar, 
Pakistan and Central Asia. The serious global economic downturn and 
the COVID-19 pandemic will cause a rethink in BRI partner nations 
on reprioritising health infrastructure. Notwithstanding the benefits of 
infrastructural development under BRI, the recipient nations also exhibit 
anxiety over debt burden as well as limited employment avenues, as much 
of the workforce is Chinese.
What adds further is that despite deep pockets and apparent 
infrastructure growth, China has not succeeded in building its soft power 
influence. As noted, in 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that, 
“We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative 
and better communicate China’s messages to the world.”2 Chinese 
attempted to enhance its soft power by promoting ‘ancient wisdom’ 
through Confucius Institutes, and now through BRI. However, on 
the contrary, China’s authoritarian system mainly in exercising control 
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over Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong negates its ‘soft image.’ More 
notably, in the South China Sea, where having promised earlier of no 
design to militarise it, China rescinded it and went ahead to do exactly 
that. In due process, China has not been able to universalise its culture at 
a popular level, or sell a lifestyle to the world, or commence engagement 
with other cultures. By all measures, China has failed to retain a more 
palatable image in the popular global culture as soft power is emblematic 
of culture, political values, and foreign policies with moral authority. 
Besides, China’s increasing ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ against the global 
resentment towards Beijing on COVID-19 has further deteriorated 
China’s ‘image’.
The other aspect to note is the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which 
despite its rapid modernisation is yet experimenting. What adds to this is the 
fact that while the PLA is conducting a large number of military exercises, 
both bilaterally and trilaterally, it cannot compensate for realistic experience 
in actual combat. This calls for serious shortcomings in both war fighting as 
well as in PLA’s command. Inevitably, this will cast a shadow on the PLA’s 
ability to take on a modern peer competitor, and hence the reliance upon 
surreptitious operations short of war. As stated that despite the technological 
advances and growing military might, PLA is “infected by the peace disease 
(hépíng bìng), peacetime habits (hépíng jixí) and peace problems (hépíng 
jibì), as it has not participated in any war since 1979.”3 Besides, corruption 
is also endemic to the PLA adding to the ‘peace infection’. Apart from the 
PLA, China’s stability is plagued by its internal tensions in Xinjiang, Tibet 
and Hong Kong; increasing corporate debt that amounts to an exorbitant 
300 per cent of GDP, heavy dependence on fuel imports and others. To 
add, COVID-19’s disruption of the global supply chains have raised the 
Chinese anxiety given foreign firms plan to shift production outside of 
China, which will result into weakening of the Chinese economy.
In view of this, pragmatism is imperative in analysing China of the 
future, which indicates a bipolar world, accompanied by concerns over 
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globalisation and most importantly, the equation between China and the 
US in the post-pandemic world. While China is deemed to become a 
superpower, likely with the highest nominal GDP, and tying down a large 
number of countries to its coattails under BRI. It is to note that there are 
less chances that China will ever abandon BRI for more than economy, 
it shoulders the geopolitical ambitions of Pax Sinica—the plan for global 
domination and leadership. In Xi’s view, it is a “once-in-a-century change” 
sweeping China and the world, wherein Pax Sinica simply does not hold 
an inclusive view of the world. 
In this case, China’s belligerence against its neighbours with inimical 
and adverse posturing may become a norm. As noted, in May 2020, at 
the 13th National People’s Congress, Xi emphasised on the pandemic’s 
“profound impact on the global landscape and on China’s security and 
development as well” calling on the PLA to “think about worst-case 
scenarios,” to improve its combat-preparedness, and be equipped to 
“deal with various complex situations in a timely and effective manner.”4 
With such intentions, China will certainly opt for hard power to coerce 
its neighbours, especially to better harness and cement its own position. 
And in doing so, often China might overreach, and will be forced to eat 
a humble pie! 
This then brings into perspective the need to analyse the tensed 
India-China relations in 2020, especially against stand-off in Eastern 
Ladakh. Over the past few decades, India had attempted to explore, and 
create huge interest in relationship building and engagement building on 
economic interdependence and negating the likelihood of a conflict. For 
instance, given the burgeoning trade at a threshold of US$ 100 billion and 
a significant politico-diplomatic engagement, India’s China policy was 
that of conciliation and restraint. However, China disallowed any forward 
movement on reconciliation of the borders. This further clarifies the 
fact that despite the growing economic interdependence, the boundary 
question between India and China continues to remain ‘exceptional and 
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overpowering.’ To which, India’s emergence as a geopolitical competitor, 
further adds to Beijing’s political antagonism towards New Delhi.
The belligerence and aggression shown by China in 2020 has 
effectively clarified that the basis of its relationship with India will continue 
to remain anarchic. Apparently, China has no inhibitions about exercising 
hard power when dealing with India, to secure its desired nationalistic 
goals. In contemplating its future relationship with China, India needs 
to take account that there are no compunctions in jettisoning norms of 
poise, decency and responsibility—which the superpower status ought to 
bring with it. In this regard, four directional pointers need mentioning.
First, the past agreements, and politico-diplomatic relationship-
building are no barometer for future rapprochement. Rather on the 
contrary, these might lead to misconceptions and complacency that may 
cause an impairment, economically or security-wise. As shared space of 
growth is not acceptable to China, strategic fundamental overhaul of 
policies is imperative. Soft-pedalling the ‘China threat,’ by adhering to 
a cautious and restraint approach will only be counter-productive. There 
ought to be clarity and transparency in approach to benefit all. 
Second, India’s larger concept of strategic autonomy, in the light of 
an inimical neighbourly superpower, needs reconsideration. It may be felt 
that in phraseology, strategic autonomy can be redefined or broad based; 
however, the terminology with its historical linkages may be conversely 
comprehended both globally and internally, cannot be ignored. Strategies 
need to be varied circumstantially; wherein, the amended paradigm calls 
for a conceptual transformation in both foreign policy decision-making 
and in protection of strategic interests. In view of this, forging of 
strategic partnerships, deep strategic cooperation, economic and 
technological ties, both bilaterally and multilaterally are hence imperative. 
For there exists a powerful motivation for coordination to balance the 
inimical adversary. 
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Third, India’s national security is at crossroads with tough and 
conflicting strategic choices, which lay down contradictory pathways 
towards differing outcomes. It has been often repeated that India’s 
tensions with China is for the long haul. While, past examples and events 
and their handling or outcomes thereof, have limited correlation with 
that of the 2020 stand-off, but the current tensions have accelerated the 
need to devise strategic choices for the long haul. The requisite lies in 
adopting a methodology to reach end state or outcomes in timelines, 
and effective planning to handle the interregnum. What further adds to 
this necessity is the fact that warfare itself is in a mode of transition. This 
makes it an optimal necessity to examine prosecution of warfare in all its 
manifestations.
Fourth, more importantly, there is severe stress on India’s national 
economy, largely due to the pandemic. While this is a separate issue, but 
an all important one, for without a buoyant economy, there will be harder 
decisions to be made. This makes credible multilateral coordination and 
the desire to better integrate with like-minded economies and supply 
chains, is the call of the day. 
Arguably, China’s intransigence and aggression of 2020 is a timely 
wake-up call, and an opportunity for India, one that mandates national 
consensus. It is a proverbial paradigm shift, for a nation with centuries of 
cultural moorings, and which has handled many a serious crisis. Hence, 
it is time for India to proceed single-mindedly to address the imperative 
transformation—thus, change is the need of the hour.
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